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Since the fall of the Constantinople in 1453, the 
question of the Turkish threat was especially se-
rious in Europe. This fear became even graver 
among Europeans after the conquest of the Killia 
and Akkerman by Turkey in 1484. Sultan Bayezid 
II regarded Kilia as a door to Moldova and Hun-
gary, and Akkerman as a door to Poland and Rus-
sia (Acta 1914, 38-39). This conquest gave them 
the possibilities to control the Polish and Hungar-
ian trade in the Black Sea area and deprived Mol-
dova of the huge part of their income (Czamańska 
1996, 153-154; Pietkiewicz 2002, 148-149; Piet-
kiewicz 2003, 86; Pilat 2010, 123-136; Pilat 2013, 
191; Gorovei 2003, 496-515; Cristea 2004, 25-36). 
From that time, the fear in Europe of the Turkish 
invasion, as well as of the awareness of the neces-
sity to defeat this enemy was great. The idea of the 
crusade against “unbelievers” became very popu-
lar among Europeans, and it was the Eastern Eu-
rope that was seen as the Antemurale christiani-
tatis in the future war. The anti-Turkish ideology 
was growing very popular (Srodecki 2015, pas-
sim; Bak 2004, 118; Knoll 1974, 381-401; Wein-
traub 1979-1980, 921-922; Baczkowski 2002, 51-
57). Among the thinkers preaching this ideology 
were many well-known Renaissance humanists, 
Callimachus and Erasmus of Rotterdam at their 
head (Materiały 1966, no 4-7; Nagy 2013, 9-28; 
Nanajvýš 2013, 31-96). In 1474 Callimachus – the 
man who was convinced about the necessity of 
the war against Turkey – assumed the position of 
the teacher for the sons of the Polish king Casimir 
Jagiellon, especially for Ferdinand and Johannes 
Olbracht (Callimachi 1962, 34; Skoczek 1956, 
20; Garbacik 1948, 33, 38; Garbacik 1964, 495; 
Krukowski 1980, 10; Niemczyk 2016a, 199). The 
second one, Johannes, was his favorite student. 
According to the common opinion – Johannes’s 
personality and worldview took shape under his 
teacher’s dominant influence and his idée fixe of 
making a war against Turkey became very close 
to him. This is the thesis that was popularized 
by several Polish Early Modern chronicles, that 
have been written by Bernard Wapowski, Mar-
cin Kromer and Joachim Bielski (Miechowita 1, 
passim; Miechowita 2, passim; Wapowski 1874, 
22-23; Bielski 1597, 482; Kromer 1857, 1326-
1327; Lukas 1879, 4-6)1. These chronicles were 
based on the second version of the Miechowita’s 
chronicle, which was a censored version re-pub-
lished by Johannes Łaski. Is it true? Or should we 
rather regard the anti-Turkish ideology only as a 
justification of the personal politics of Johannes 
Olbracht? There were many humanists, who en-
sured their readers about Olbracht’s hostile atti-
tude towards Turkey. These were the humanists 
among whom the ideology of “antemurale chris-
tianitatis” was extremely popular and among 
whom the idea of the crusade against Turkey was 
often used as a pretext to explain other politi-
cal goals and justify war expeditions (Smołucha 
1999, 60; Papée 2006, 58, 61; Ulmann 1884, 
208). Also, for the Polish king such a pretext, cru-
sade against Turkey was, extremely convenient in 
the existing political situation. At that time, when 
a threat from the South-East was very serious for 
all the Christian Europe, a decision on organizing 
the crusade against Turkey must have been sup-
ported by Europeans. This problem of the role of 
the “Antemurale Christianitatis” ideology in the 
late medieval period was thoroughly researched 
1 The first version of the Chronicle, see: Maciej z Miechowa, 
Chronica Polonorum, Kraków 1519 and the changed ver-
sion: J. Pistorius, Polonicae Historiae Corpus hoc est, Po-
lonicarum rerum Latini recentiores et veteres scriptores, 
quotquot extant, uno volumine comprehaensi omnes, et 
in aliquot distributi Tomos, Basileae 1582, Bd. 2. In the 
Miechowita’s chronicle Olbracht hasn’t been described as a 
person who above all want to fight against Turkey. Such an 
image of the Polish king preserved just Wapowski.
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by Paul Srodecki2. A conversation I was lucky to 
have with him during the conference in Debrecen, 
was an impulse for me to conduct a research on 
this problem (Srodecki 2015, 217-265). In this ar-
ticle, I would like to analyze some of the sources, 
so that I would be able to answer to the question 
of to what extent this anti-Turkish ideology, that 
was preached in these sources, was indeed the 
true reason of the Johannes Olbracht’s crusade, 
or whether it was but a propagandist pretext to 
execute his political goals. 
In my opinion, the decisions that had been made 
during the meeting in Levoca 1494 were of cru-
cial importance, and by them we can explain this 
issue. The meeting was organized in April 1494. 
This should have been a meeting of the whole 
Jagiellonian brothers: Johannes Olbracht, Alex-
ander, Sigismund, Frederik and Wladislaus, but 
Alexander couldn’t attend it. Although this meet-
ing lasted three weeks, there is a significant lack 
of documents connected with this conference. It 
is actually not true that there are no documents 
from Levoca at all, because there are three docu-
ments preserved in the Archive in Sibiu3, another 
two are in the Budapest’s Archive4 (Tibor 2014, 
399; Hopp 1992, 46) and one in Nürnberg (Wag-
ner 1885, 507). However, these documents can’t 
help us with the reconstruction of the course of 
the meeting as well as of the decisions that had 
been made there. This lack of diplomatic sourc-
es makes the research on this question difficult. 
There is the Chronicle of Miechowita (in two 
versions), the text of Bonfini, the instruction for 
the Hungarian envoy – Wladislaus Lasonczy and 
some “rumors” that we can find in several other 
sources. 
The chronicle written by Matthias of Miechów 
(Miechowita) is one of the most important 
sources of information for this case because all 
the further Polish chronicles were based on the 
second version of Miechowita’s chronicle. The 
problem is, that the true version that was writ-
ten by Matthias of Miechów was censored and 
altered by Johannes Łaski and reprinted in the 
2 The Jagiellonians in Europe: Dynastic Diplomacy and For-
eign Relations/ Die Jagiellonen in Europa: Dynastische und 
Diplomatische Beziehungen. International Conference and 
Roundtable, 10-11 April 2015, Department of History, Uni-
versity of Debrecen, Debrecen, Hungary.
3 Direcţia Judeţeană Sibiu a Arhivelor Naţionale ale Româ-
niei, Colecţia de documente medievale, Serie U.II, Inventar 
25, no 557, 558, 561.
4 Magyar Országos Levéltár (Budapest), no 24771.
year 1521. According to both versions (the first 
and the amended one) during the meeting in Le-
voca (1494) Jagiellons made many decisions re-
garding the Moldova’s and Turkey’s case but, as 
Matthias of Miechów said, all the treaties were 
revoked. The main difference between the first 
and the censured version of the chronicle is the 
goal of the Johannes Olbracht crusade in 1497. 
In the original version, there is a narrative only 
about the campaign against Moldova, while in the 
altered version Turkey is given as the aim of the 
Olbracht’s crusade (Miechowita 1, 348; Miechow-
ita 2, 349). In the original version, the author de-
scribed a lot of signs that announced the failure 
of this crusade: king’s horse drowned in the river, 
during the service the priest dropped the host on 
the ground and so on (Miechowita 1, 349; Borzem-
ski 1890, 72; Lewicki 1893, 24-25). In this version 
also, we can feel the author’s indignation, reveal-
ing that he was definitely against this expedition. 
In the second version of the chronicle, such signs 
were either removed or reinterpreted: the king’s 
horse admittedly drowns but the king was safe 
and sound; the host fell but only on one occasion 
and it was immediately picked up (Miechowita 2, 
349-350; Borzemski 1890, 72; Lewicki 1893, 24-
25). Such badly-boding signs didn’t match to the 
crusade against “unbelievers”. The second version 
of the Miechowita’s chronicle was the source-text 
for the later chroniclers, Wapowski and Kromer. 
It was Kromer, who created the Olbracht’s image 
as the man who, above all, wanted to fight against 
Turkey. Kromer, who based his treatise on the sec-
ond version of Miechowita’s chronicle, was con-
vinced that the Olbracht’s crusade was directed 
against Turkey. The Polish king should have been 
under the strong influence of the Callimachus and 
believed that he can overcome the Turkish threat. 
In order to strengthen his opinion, Kromer 
changed the dates of some of the events: he wrote 
that one of the reasons for Olbracht’s crusade was 
two Turkish expeditions along the Adriatic coast. 
As a response, the Polish king sent his envoy – 
Krzeslaw of Kurozwęki to the Stephan the Great 
with the information that Olbracht intended to 
make a crusade against Turkey in the spring of 
the next year. The truth is that these Turkish ex-
peditions on Atlantic coast took place in April and 
June 1497 (Wapowski 1874, 22-23; Lukas 1879, 
4), and Krzeslaw of Kurozwęki was in Moldova 
at the beginning of the 1497 (Miechowita 2, 240; 
Wapowski 1874, 22-25; Czamańska 1996, 168, 
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174-175; Papée 2006, 127-128; Górka 1932, 70-
71; Kujawski 1987, 73; Tarnowski 1855, 41; Niem-
czyk 2014, 60; Niemczyk 2016b, 148), that is long 
before Turkish expedition. So, the chronology, 
that was given by Kromer, is false. He also didn’t 
mention all these bad signs, that were mentioned 
by Miechowita. They didn’t match to his concep-
tion of the military expedition as the crusade in 
order to defend Christianity. However, Kromer 
wrote also, that he knew, that during the meeting 
in Levoca, Johannes Olbracht announced his plan 
to conquer Moldova and hand over her throne to 
his brother – Sigismund (Wapowski 1874, 20). 
Kromer wrote explicitly that “it was believed that 
he [Johannes Olbracht] wanted to conquer Mol-
dova and only to mislead Stephan the Great he 
has spoken about the crusade against Turkey” 
(Kromer 1857, 1326). Bielski reinforced this the-
sis writing in addition, that Johannes Olbracht 
wanted to fight against Turkey to avenge the 
death of Wladislaus of Varna, but he also men-
tioned that the Polish king had one more goal: he 
wanted to take the throne back from Stephan the 
Great and gave it to his brother, Sigismund. Hav-
ing achieved this goal, he would have intended 
to fight against Turkey (Bielski 1597, 482-484). 
Although the Olbracht’s anti-Turkish attitude is 
strongly underlined in all of the above-mentioned 
chronicles, there are mentions saying that dur-
ing the meeting in Levoca Polish king planned to 
take the Moldova’s throne back from Stephan the 
Great and give it to Sigismund. 
Antonio Bonfini – Italian humanist, Matthias 
Corvinus’ court historian and author of the His-
tory of Hungary, who wrote a lot about course of 
the meeting in Levoca, gave us some additional 
information about the meeting in Levoca, but 
unfortunately not much about the decisions that 
were there made. According to him, the meet-
ing in Levoca was a manifestation of the power 
of Jagiellons. There were some decisions made 
against a certain undefined “enemy” (Bonfini 
1581, 714-715; Finkel 1914, 328; Wagner 1882, 
316-327; Wagner 1885, 465-510 (especially p. 
507-508); Ulmann 1975, 149-161; Vogel 1867, 39-
44; Klüpfel 1846, 110). Unfortunately, there is no 
explanation on what kind of enemy he meant. It is 
known however, that the man, who the emperor 
Maximilian Habsburg trusted in, Christoph von 
Lichtenstein, on the 5th March of the year 1494 in-
formed him that he knows form Hungary’s “great 
friends” that the Polish king with his brothers: the 
king of Hungary and the great prince of Lithuania 
organized a meeting “in Czaslaw or in its vicinity” 
and concluded there some treaties. Unfortunate-
ly, he didn’t know what the reason of the meeting 
is, but he promised to learn more about it (Chmel 
1845, no 28). Unfortunately, we don’t have access 
to his later reports. It seems that Maximilian was 
afraid that the goal of this meeting was to make a 
covenant against him, because on the 8th of April 
he gave directions to his envoy who should have 
been sent to Ivan III to renew mutual treaty be-
tween him and Ivan against the Jagiellonian dy-
nasty. This envoy wasn’t sent at the end (Chmel 
1845, no 32; Finkel 1914, 336)5. Some historians 
supposed that this „enemy” about whom Bonfini 
wrote, was Maximilian (Finkel 1914, 329-338). 
I think, that the problem with Maximilian, who 
wanted to take over the power in Hungary, was 
the important point of the meeting, but at that 
time, Maximilian was involved in the war against 
France, so it hadn’t make any sense to form an al-
liance against him at that time. I think that as this 
“enemy” we should regard Turkey. 
The other sources to this question are: the in-
struction for the envoy of Hungarians – Wladis-
laus Lasonczy, who was sent by Wladislav II to 
Johannes Olbracht during his endeavor to con-
quer Suceava, as well as the other instruction for 
Olbracht’s envoy who was sent with the answer 
for the previous letter (Materiały 1966, 25, no 13, 
14). In the instruction first mentioned, Wladis-
laus II accused his brother – Johannes Olbracht 
– of breaking the treaty from Levoca. There was 
decided that Olbracht should attack Turkey, not 
Moldova, and this was confirmed in Prague by 
Olbracht’s envoy – Johannes of Chodecz. But 
Wladislaus suspected that in reality his brother’s 
goal is to conquer Moldova and hand over this 
throne to his brother, Sigismund. He also sup-
posed that Olbracht had been preparing such a 
plan from three years, since the meeting in Le-
voca and then his agreement not to attack Mol-
dova, was from the beginning, a farce. Wladislaus 
wrote also that Hungary was forced to defend 
the ruler of Moldova because the actions of Pol-
ish king was very dangerous for further relations 
between Hungary, Poland, Moldova and Turkey, 
so Wladislaus had to prevent it (Materiały 1966, 
25, no 13). In the answer to this accusation, Ol-
5 Finkel supposed that the reason that the envoys weren’t sent 
was the plan of the marriage between Alexander Jagiellon 
and Helena.
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bracht explained that he didn’t break the treaty 
from Levoca because there was decided that he 
should conquer Kyllia and Akkerman and hand it 
over to the Stephan the Great („castra illa, que 
per Turcum recepta erant, Voievode Moldavie 
recuperarentur”). He also explained that there 
was no peace treaty between Poland and Turkey 
because the Polish envoy, who was sent to Con-
stantinople to resolve this case, came back with-
out sultan’ confirmation of this treaty. Stephan 
the Great wanted to support Polish king in this 
expedition but, according to the Olbracht’s ex-
planation, he suddenly changed his mind and 
supported the Turkish side. The ruler of Moldo-
va sent his envoys: Tăutul and Isac6 to Olbracht 
with a demand to withdraw the Polish army from 
Moldova, but the Polish king ignored it, captured 
Moldova’s envoys and started his expedition 
against Suceava. Olbracht explained additionally 
that Bartholomeus Drágffy was a Turkish ally as 
well. In this complicated situation, he decided to 
attack Suceava. As he made this decision, he in-
tended to inform Wladislaus about it, but then he 
noticed that Hungarian’s envoys headed towards 
him, so he decided not to wait for them but at-
tack the capital of Moldova. In that moment Hun-
garian’s envoy – Wladislaus Lasonczy – reached 
him with the demand to withdraw the Polish 
army from Moldova. Lasonczy accused him ad-
ditionally that he wants to deliver the throne of 
Moldova into the hands of Sigismund (Materiały 
1966, no 14; Naker 1874, 312; Lewicki 1893, 5). It 
seems that there is some inaccuracy in Olbracht’s 
explanations. The first mentioned document is 
corrupted: we don’t know his exact dating, but we 
know that it was written to Olbracht who already 
was “in Moldavia”. Lasonczy was sent in response 
to Olbracht’s decision to attack Suceava. Hungar-
ians’ envoy accused the Polish king of an inten-
tion to break the treaty in Levoca, to conquer 
Moldova and to give her throne to Sigismund. 
However, Johannes Olbracht explained that it 
was Stephan the Great who betray him first, that 
is why he decided to attack Moldova. In this mo-
ment, he saw Hungarians’ envoy who wanted to 
reach him. Nevertheless, he started the expedi-
tion to Suceava and tried to conquer the capital of 
this country. Then the Hungarians’ envoy reached 
6 The names of the Moldova’s envoys are mentioned in some 
Chronicle: Letopiseţul de la Bistrița 1895, 59; Letopiseţul 
anonim 2004, 19; Letopiseţul de la Putna II 2004, 37; Cro-
nica moldo-polonă 2004, 44-45.
him. So, according to Olbracht’s explanation, 
Hungarians’ envoy who came to him with the ac-
cusations of attacking Stephan the Great, should 
have been sent before this attack happened. How, 
in another way, can the fact be explained, that in 
that very moment, when the Polish king decided 
to attack Suceava, Moldovan’s envoy had already 
been seen back by the Polish king? There are two 
opportunities: either it was Olbracht who first at-
tacked Stephan the Great, and after that the Hun-
garians’ envoy was sent with all these accusations 
and demands to withdraw the Polish army from 
Moldova or Hungarians from the beginning sup-
posed that the Polish king planned to conquer 
Moldova and his latest action of capturing Moldo-
van’s envoys only confirmed Hungary’s fears and 
that is why the envoy was sent before Olbracht’s 
attack on Moldova. In older Polish historiography 
(Finkel 1914, 340), it was written that in the dis-
cussed document of Olbracht, not the meeting in 
Levoca was meant, but the Polish sejmik. Accord-
ing to this point of view Olbracht wasn’t accused 
of breaking the treaty with Wladislaus but with 
the Polish nobility. The answer to this question 
gives us the second of the mentioned documents: 
an instruction for Wladislaus Lasonczy written by 
Wladislaus II to his brother Johannes Olbracht. 
In that document Olbracht is accused of break-
ing „tractatus inter nos et eius majestatem in pri-
mis in conventu nostro Leuczoviensi” (Materiały 
1966, no 13). Therefore, the Polish king answer-
ing to this document had to refer to the charge 
of breaking the treaty of Levoca and not to any 
agreement regarding the Polish sejmik. So, the 
Polish king was accused by his brother of attack-
ing Moldova in order to hand over her throne 
to Sigismund, what was against earlier mutual 
agreement. Olbracht had to have such plans and 
intensions before Wladislaus wrote that he sup-
posed that Olbracht had such plans in the last 
three years, since the meeting in Levoca 1494 and 
Wladislaus knew about it (Wiszniewski 1841, 455-
459; Czamańska 1996, 173)7.
In the documents from the court of Sigismund I 
the Old, Moldova is mentioned as a goal of the 
crusade of the year 1497 (“in conflictu Moldavi-
ensi”; “ante exitum versus Moldaviam”). It has 
been written that during this expedition “de Mol-
davia” register books (perditum) were lost and 
7 It was Callimachus who should have given Olbracht an idea 
to place Sigismund on the Moldova’s throne.
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that is why the new must have been made (Kozák 
2014, LVI-LVII).
Another important source for the Olbracht’s cru-
sade is the Liborius Naker’s diary. Naker was a 
secretary of the Grandmaster of the Teutonic 
Order Johann von Tieffen and accompanied him 
during the expedition of 1497. Naker mentioned 
some “rumors” about Olbracht’s intentions to 
hand over the throne in Moldova to his brother 
Sigismund (Naker 1874, 312; Kromer 1857, 1328). 
Naker mentioned also that some nobleman whose 
name was Marcin informed the Grandmaster that 
the Polish king didn’t intend to attack Turkey but 
to expel Stephan the Great out of his country. This 
nobleman said then that Stephan the Great had to 
pay kharaj to the Turkey for 30 years, because of 
the lack of Polish protection. Although Stephan 
had asked Poland for help, he didn’t get it. This 
was the reason, why he was forced to pay money 
to Turkey. But he had thought about how he can 
reduce these costs. Therefore, he had given mon-
ey to some Russian named Mucha [Fly] and had 
persuaded him to attack the South-East part of 
Poland together with Tatars in order to get some 
money and other goods, that he had needed to pay 
kharaj. Young Johannes Olbracht had often been 
brought to Podolia so that he could see what kind 
of disaster was made by “Walachian” and tried to 
convince his father to make a war against Mol-
dova. According to Naker, Casimir Jagiellon had 
put the decision away for later time, because of 
the queen, who had got certain gifts from Stefan 
the Great. After Johannes Olbracht had ascended 
the Polish throne, he put the decision about the 
expedition way for a later and more proper time 
as well, but after all he decided to wage the war 
against Moldova and wanted to depose Stephan 
the Great (Naker 1874, 306-307).
There are some events that happened during Ol-
bracht’s crusade that seems to indicate that the 
above-mentioned “rumors” about Olbracht’s in-
tentions to deliver the throne of Moldova into his 
brother Sigismund’s hands, were not completely 
false. Some indication of Olbracht’s plan an-
nounced during the meeting in Levoca was the at-
titude of Wladislaus II to it. The king of Hungary 
agreed to make an expedition in order to conquer 
Kilia and Akkerman, but he insisted that no war 
against Moldova would be allowed (Materiały 
1966, no 14). Probably he wouldn’t do this if 
his brother hadn’t had such plan or intention. 
What is more, Wladislaus obliged Olbracht not 
to make any decision regarding this expedition 
without an agreement of the Stephan the Great. 
What’s more, during the crusade Wladislaus sent 
his envoy-Lasonczy to Olbracht who already at-
tacked Suceava, with the accusation of breaking 
the treaty in Levoca and of having an intention 
to hand over the Moldova’s throne to Sigismund. 
He suspected that Olbracht had had such a plan 
for three years, so since the meeting in Levoca 
(Materiały 1966, no 13; Lewicki 1893, 5). So, Ol-
bracht must already had had the over-mentioned 
plan during the meeting in Levoca. 
In several Lithuanian and Russian documents, 
the information about the aim of Olbracht’s cru-
sade is ambiguous (Hustinskaja lietopis 1874, 
304, 312; Bychowiec Chronicle 1846, 64-66; 
Материалы 1887, 147; Citko 2006, passim). Ac-
cording to one of the Lithuanian’s chronicles, so 
called Bychowca Chronicle, the meeting in Lev-
oca lasted two weeks and was very mysterious8.
The main arrangements between Olbracht and 
Alexander for this campaign were made later, 
at their meeting in Parczew in November 1496 
(Оболенский 1836, 143; Сборник 1913, 225; Ko-
lankowski 1930, 386). Unfortunately, we don’t 
know what were the decisions that had been 
made there, but it is known, that in 1496 Stephan 
the Great and Mengli Girej were already called as 
the “enemies of the Great Duchy of Lithuania” 
(Сборник 1913, 225; Kolankowski 1930, 386). Al-
exander Jagiellon who had been asked by Lithu-
anian’s noblemen during the crusade about its 
goal, swore that he couldn’t say anything about 
it (Bychowiec Chronicle 1846, 64-65). During the 
preparation to this expedition Olbracht had sent 
a letter to Alexander in which he tried to persuade 
him to hurry up with the fulfilling of his marriage 
with the daughter of Ivan III because of the need 
for the peace along the Eastern boarder during 
the planned crusade (Finkel 1914, 20-21). Alex-
ander was also obligated to give his support for 
the Polish army (Bychowiec Chronicle 1846, 65; 
Borzemski 1890, 68-69)9. Also, Ivan III had been 
informed about the planned crusade and even 
Polish envoy Ivan Sapieha invited him to join the 
8 According to this chronicle also Alexander Jagiellon parti-
cipated in the meeting in Levoca, but this is of course false 
information. 
9 Alexander’s army during the crusade stopped near Bratslav, 
because their goal was to stop possible Ivan’s reinforce-
ments for Moldova.
II. Materiale și cercetări
36
alliance10 (Lietuvos 1993, 12011; Сборник 1882, 
233; Czamańska 1996, 168; Pietkiewicz 2014, 
38), but he rejected this proposal and ordered 
Alexander not to support his brother in the ex-
pedition “against Wallachia”. Alexander tried to 
explain him that the goal of the expedition is Ta-
tar, not “Wallachia”, but Ivan III seemed not to 
believe it (Материалы 1887, 147; Lukas 1879, 7; 
Borzemski 1890, 69). In order to stop the possible 
support from Ivan’s army for Stephan the Great, 
Alexander’s army should have centered around 
Bratslav during the crusade. Its task was to ob-
serve and prevent any Ivan’s support for Mol-
dova (Материалы 1887, 147; Borzemski 1890, 
69). As Alexander’s army reached Bratslav, there 
came Ivan’s envoy who warned Alexander not to 
help his brother. That is why Alexander sent to 
Olbracht only some small troops under the com-
mand of Stanislaus Kiszka. These troops reached 
the destination of their expedition too late, at the 
29th of October, after the battle of the Cosmin 
Forest (Spieralski 1963, 47; Kolankowski 1930, 
437; Papée 2006, 152-154). In the Lithuanian and 
Russian sources there is also information that at 
that time the Jagiellonian dynasty had a big prob-
lem with the fact that their younger brother – Si-
gismund hadn’t had any land to rule. Bychowski 
Chronicle informs us about this problem, and, 
above all, the documents issued by Alexander (By-
chowiec Chronicle 1846, 63; Акты 1846, № 135, 
док. I-VI; Lukas 1879, 7-11)12. After Cazimir IV Ja-
giellon’s death, it turned out, that only Sigismund 
didn’t receive any land to rule. All what he had 
was money received from his brother, Olbracht. 
The Polish sejm in Piotrkow asked the king Jo-
hannes Olbracht to help his brother and give him 
money. However, this situation hurt Sigismund’s 
pride, so he demanded to give him some territory 
to rule. Johannes Olbracht, who felt that he was 
left alone with this problem, held a grudge against 
his second brother – Alexander, who didn’t want 
to help him to solve this issue. Therefore, the 
king’s mother – Elisabeth from Habsburg and 
his younger brother Frederik went to Vilnius to 
persuade Alexander to give to Sigismund some 
territory, but the duke of Lithuania refused. Sigis-
10 The letter was written in Vilnus at 10 May 1497, and delive-
red by Ivan Sapieha
11 The letter was written in Vilnus at 10 May 1497, and delive-
red by Ivan Sapieha.
12 In Akty – there are instruction for Alexander’s envoys who 
had been sent to Olbracht and his mother with the answer to 
their demands to give Sigismund some territory.
mund was so annoyed that he sent his envoys to 
Alexander time after time13 (Bychowiec Chronicle 
1846, 63; Акты 1846, № 135, док. I-VI; Lukas 
1879, 7; Papée 2006, 111) The duke of Lithuania 
complained in the letter (from April 1496) to his 
mother, about Sigismund’s importunateness and 
explained that he was not able to offer him any 
territory within the lands belonging to the Duchy 
of Lithuania, even if he wanted to do this (Акты 
1846, № 135, док. I-VI). There were also plans 
to give him a part of the Kiev Voivodship, but be-
cause of the Ivan III’s indignations this plan was 
abandoned14 (Акты 1846, № 135, док. I-VI, 136). 
So, it is obvious that there was a huge problem 
with the territory that should have been given to 
Sigismund and Jagiellons wanted to solve it in 
some way. For Johannes Olbracht, who believed 
himself to be left alone with this issue, it was a 
priority question and Moldova seemed to be per-
fect as a solution of this problem.
There are also other helpful sources: report 
from Nikolaus from Rosenberg – Polish envoy 
in Freiburg, in which he was convinced that Ol-
bracht’s crusade was organized against “unbeliev-
er”, several letters written by Stephan the Great, 
Turkish chronicles and Romanian sources. The 
war “against Turkey” is also mentioned in Lviv’s 
accounting books (Iorga 1899, no 8; Smołucha 
1999, 68). In Venetian sources, there is informa-
tion that this crusade was made against Turkey, 
but this was exactly what Johannes Olbracht 
tried to make Europe convinced about and Euro-
pean diplomacy seemed to believe in this (I Dia-
rii 1879, 756-757; Cristea 2013a, 120). The older 
Polish historiography, who regarded Stephan’s 
attitude towards Poland and Lithuania before the 
crusades as “very friendly” cited those Venetian 
sources. Poland and Lithuania should have been, 
according to them, very surprised about changing 
Stephan’s standpoint during the expedition. It was 
the effect of the propaganda, that was preached 
by Jagiellons and that had been preserved in the 
European sources in which it was widely dis-
seminated: Jagiellons didn’t know nothing about 
13 Sigismund sent Alexander Hieronim to Alexander Jagiellon, 
but the answer that he got: Alexander will confer in this 
case with Elisabeth of Habsburg and with his brothers, was 
not that he expected to receive. So, he sent another envoy 
– Christopher of Szydłowiec, who demanded to give Sigis-
mund some territory. In answer, Alexander Jagiellon sent 
(in April 1496) over-mentioned envoy to his mother and Jo-
hannes Olbracht. 
14 Ivan III sent the letter to his daughter – the wife of Alexan-
der, that she should persuade his husband out of doing this.
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Stephan’s hostile standpoint, they were surprised 
and were forced to attack him during the crusade. 
But the fact is, that Poland had sent to Stephan 
the Great an envoy – Krzesław of Kurozwęki who 
informed Olbracht about unfriendly standpoint of 
Stephan. This shows, that the sources are wrong, 
and that was only the Jagiellon’s propaganda and 
Jagiellons knew about the unfriendly attitude of 
Stephan. It is possible, that the Polish king inten-
tionally ignored the Kurozwęcki’s warning, and 
counted on Stephan’s refusal in case of crossing 
the border of his country, because that would 
have given him pretext to attack Moldova. In 
this way Olbracht would execute his plans from 
Levoca, that had to be cancelled because of his 
brother’s – Wladislaus – standpoint. But Stephan 
the Great was warned by his friend Bartholome-
us Drágffy, who was present at the meeting in 
Suceava, about the plan of Polish king and was 
seriously afraid of it (Niemczyk 2015, 104, 107). 
According to the Turkish documents and letters, 
Stephan turned to the sultan with the informa-
tion that Olbracht planned the war, but he him-
self wasn’t sure against whom. However, he en-
sured sultan that he would support in the case of 
war, but in return for it he would count probably 
also for sultan’s help. Additionally, he wrote in 
the letter to Bayezid, that the Hungarian’s army 
gathered in Transylvania (Anafarta 1970, no 1; 
Kissling 1988a, 136-155; Kissling 1988b, 163-195; 
Smołucha 1999, 415)15. In reply to this letter sul-
tan commanded Stephan to attack Transylvania 
but the Moldova’s ruler explained that he couldn’t 
do this because he was afraid of possible attack 
of Tatars (Anafarta 1970, no 1, 2)16.To the distrust 
towards Poland we can also join Stephan’s letter 
of unknown dating to sultan in which he asked 
him for help (Ludovici 1874, 333-334; Spieral-
ski 1963, 47) as well as sending Moldova’s envoy 
Tăutul to Constantinople (Górka 1932, 71; Papée 
2006, 67; Fac 2007, 62).
The aim and the course of the crusade was de-
scribed in Polish and Turkish sources in another 
way. According to Polish chronicle (Wapowski, 
Kromer, Bielski) it was a crusade against Turkey. 
Kromer wrote that “it was said” that Olbracht 
wanted to conquer Moldova and hand over the 
throne of this land to his brother – Sigismund, 
15 The original – Turkish version of the Chronicle, see: Kiss-
ling 1988a, 136-155 and Kissling 1988b, 163-195, author 
translated this text into German.
16 The Stephan the Great’s letter to the sultan.
this was decided in Levoca, but – Kromer wrote 
– this were only some rumors made up by Hun-
garians because they were afraid to lose influence 
on Moldova and that is why they wanted to set 
Stephan the Great against Poland. The ruler of 
Moldova wanted to conduct a war against Tur-
key, but he was afraid of the rumors and of the 
fact that Olbracht’s army went not towards Killia 
and Akkerman but towards Pokuttya. So, he sent 
two envoys to the Polish king to ask him about 
his intentions. He ensured Olbracht, that if he 
wanted to fight against Turkey, Stephan would 
help him, but he warned him against starting 
the war with his own country. Olbracht, who was 
outraged, caught the envoys, sent them to Lviv 
and went towards Suceava. According to this 
chronicle Wladislaus II demanded Olbracht’s 
army to immediately leave Moldova. The Pol-
ish king who was already sick, agreed and made 
peace with the ruler of Moldova. Stephan warned 
him against choosing another – the shortest one 
– route towards Poland, because of the Turkish 
trap. The Polish king ignored this advice and in 
consequences fell into a trap in which, accord-
ing to Kromer, Stephan the Great also took part. 
So, according to Kromer the ruler of Moldova at 
first tried to warn Olbracht about this Turkish 
trap (Bielski 1597, 484; Kromer 1857, 1328-1333; 
Miechowita 2, 350; Wapowski 1874, 24-29).
The same events were described in completely an-
other way in Turkish documents and chronicles, 
for example: old-Turkish chronicles translated 
by Kreuter (Kreutel 1978, 92-98) and Kissling 
(Kissling 1988a, 136-155; Kissling 1988b, 157-
195). According to the first one, Stephan the Great 
was obligated not only to allow the Polish army 
to cross this border, but also promised to sup-
port them. As a reward, he should have received 
two towns, which names were not mentioned in 
the chronicle, but it was written, that earlier they 
had belonged to Turkey (Kreutel 1978, 212-216; 
Smołucha 1999, 417)17. When Polish army reached 
Moldova, Stephan changed his mind and took the 
Turkish side. As soon as Polish army crossed the 
border of Moldova, he sent his envoy to Mesih Pa-
sha – the ruler of Silistra – asking him for help. 
However, there were only 800 knights who came 
to Stephan with help – way too little. That is why, 
Stephan-who knew that with this small army he 
is not able to defeat the Polish forces, and was 
17 Most probably Killia and Akkerman is meant here.
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afraid of Olbracht’s revenge for his betrayal, de-
cided to set a trap for him. He informed the Polish 
king that the huge number of the Turkish army 
crossed Moldova’s border and he strongly advised 
Olbracht to choose a retreat. To protect Polish 
king, he warned him against choosing the shorter 
route towards Poland, that lead through a ravine. 
Johannes Olbracht didn’t take it into consider-
ation and fell into the trap (Kissling 1988b, 185; 
Cristea 2011, 97; Cristea 2013b, 259-260). 
There is also Letopiseţul de la Bistriţa (called also 
Chronicle of Bistriţa) that gives us additional in-
formation to this problem. This source had been 
written in Moldova at the turn of the 15th and 
16th centuries, probably by two different persons 
(Letopiseţul de la Bistriţa 1895, 59; Czamańska 
2010a, 1019-1020). According to this codex, 
Stephan’s decision was not to allow the Polish 
army to cross Moldova’s boarder, which caused 
a big problem for Olbracht, whose goal was to 
conquer Kilia and Akkerman. Going towards 
Kilia and Akkerman without Stephan’s permis-
sion was too risky, so Olbracht decided to force 
the ruler of Moldova to cooperate and therefore 
attacked Suceava, but without any final success 
(Letopiseţul de la Bistriţa 1895, 59). However, Ol-
bracht’s brother Wladislaus was strongly worried 
about this situation and demanded to withdraw 
the Polish army from Moldova. The Polish king 
who had no other option, made a peace treaty 
with Stephan at the 18th of October. The ruler of 
Moldova advised him to avoid the shortest route 
towards Poland, because it’s very dangerous, but 
the Polish king ignored this advice. In effect on 
the 26th of October the Polish army was defeated 
in the battle of the Cosmin Forest (Letopiseţul de 
la Bistriţa 1895, 59-60). So, Chronicle of Bistriţa 
gives the same information as Polish chroni-
cles, just as the Letopiseţul anonim al Moldovei 
(Letopiseţul anonim 2004, 18-19). In Letopiseţul 
de la Putna I, which was written at the turn of the 
15th and 16th century as a part of the Codex of Po-
chayiv by an unknown author, it has been written 
that Stephan supposed that Olbracht had a plan 
to conquer his land and that was why he sent to 
him his envoys: Isac and Tăutul, but they were 
caught by the Polish king, and then Olbracht at-
tacked Suceava (Letopiseţul de la Putna I 2004, 
33; Czamańska 2010b, 1020; Czamańska 2010c, 
1020; Letopiseţul anonim 2004, 19; Letopiseţul 
de la Putna II 2004, 37; Cronica moldo-polonă 
2004, 44-45; Letopiseîul Ţării Moldovei 2004, 
60-62; Kromer 1857, 1328-1329; Wapowski 1874, 
26). In an anonymous Letopiseţul de la Putna II, a 
part of the same Codex as Letopiseţul de la Putna 
I, Olbracht was called a swindler, who spoke about 
the war against Turkey, but in reality, he wanted 
to conquer Killia and Akkerman and attack Mol-
dova. Stephan, to stop Olbracht, sent to him his 
envoys: Isac and Tăutul (Letopiseţul de la Putna 
II 2004, 37; Czamańska 2010c, 1020). According 
to the Cronica moldo-polonă, Letopiseţul Ţării 
Româneşti şi a Ţării Moldovei and Letopiseţul 
Ţării Moldovei the king of Hungary as well as 
the ruler of Transylvania sent 12000 knights to 
help Stephan (Cronica moldo-polonă 2004, 44; 
Letopiseţul Ţării Moldovei 2004, 61; Letopiseţul 
Ţării Româneşti 2004, 131). There is also Chron-
icle moldo-germană that gives additional infor-
mation. Olbracht spoke about the war against 
Turkey, but Stephan didn’t believe him and sent 
envoys to him to demand not to attack Moldova, 
but Olbracht caught his envoy (Cronica moldo-
germană 2004, 29). 
The fundamentally difference between Polish 
and Turkish chronicles is Stephan’s standpoint 
during the Olbracht’s crusade. According to the 
Polish sources (but also Romanian’s Chronicle of 
Bistriţa) Stephan wanted to warn Olbracht about 
the trap, for he was concerned about his safety, 
but according to the Turkish chronicles he inten-
tionally led him into the trap. There is also no in-
formation about his attack at Suceava. What real-
ly happened? It’s doubtful that Stephan, who was 
afraid of the real goal of the Olbracht’s crusade, 
wanted to protect him. The standpoint of the Pol-
ish sources is probably connected with the fact, 
that they spoke about the war against Turkey, not 
Moldova, so such an unfriendly standpoint of the 
Moldova’s ruler didn’t pass to this description at 
all. I. Czamańska – one of the most important Pol-
ish historian – said that there was only one route 
to Poland, so it is obvious that Stephan wanted 
to lead Olbracht’s army into a trap (Czamańska 
1989, 303; Rezachevici, Căpăţina 1975, 370).
Trying to conclude this article and answer the 
main question: if the war against Turkey the real 
goal of Johannes Olbracht was, or only a propa-
ganda, that gave him a pretext to war and justify 
a different political goal. It is obvious that there 
was no Jagiellon’s conspiracy against Moldova 
(this idea was very popular in Polish historiog-
raphy at the turn of the 20th century (Caro 1888, 
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721-722; Borzemski 1890, 66). Olbracht acted on 
his own will and against his brother Wladislaus’ 
wishes, so this could not be a conspiracy. Also, the 
idea that the crusade was intended only against 
Moldova must be rejected. In the existing politi-
cal situation, the attack at Moldova meant also 
the war against Turkey and Olbracht must have 
known about it. In my opinion, the decisions that 
have been made during the meeting in Levoca 
1494 are of critical importance to explain this is-
sue. During the meeting, the Jagiellons disputed 
about some “enemy”, who in my opinion was 
Turkey. In my opinion, the main problem, that 
was discussed in Levoca, was how to prevent the 
Turkish treat. The solution of this problem was to 
build a buffer at the South-East side of the Europe 
to protect both Hungary and Poland. According 
to the sources, Olbracht wanted to put Moldova 
under the authority of his brother – Sigismund, 
who would willingly play this role. In this way 
not only the bastion would be created, but also 
Sigismund would have get the land to rule, and 
as we know, it was one of the biggest problem for 
the Jagiellons (especially for Johannes Olbracht 
and Alexander). However, Wladislaus didn’t 
agree with this idea at all. He was worried to lose 
Hungarian influences in Moldova, and to inten-
sify her relations with Turkey and rise the treat 
from its side. The war against Turkey was out of 
the question for Hungary because of the peace 
made between them. Instead of this, he proposed 
Poland to conquer Kilia and Akkerman – two 
towns conquered lately by Turkey, but on condi-
tion that they will be hand over to the Stephan 
the Great (Materiały 1966, no 14). The Turkish 
chronicle from the time of the Bayezid II’s reign 
seems to confirm this information, as it was writ-
ten there that Stephan the Great not only made a 
treaty with Poland and intended to allow the Pol-
ish army to cross boarder of his country but also 
guaranteed his support for this expedition. In re-
ward for this help, he should have received two 
– previous Turkish – towns, which names weren’t 
mentioned in this chronicle, but this must have 
been Killia and Akkerman (Kreutel 1978, 212-
216; Smołucha 1999, 417). Taking the Kilia and 
Akkerman by Poland would have meant extend-
ing Poland’s authority over the Moldova and its 
control over the Black Sea’s trade. That wasn’t an 
option for Wladislaus. So, he ordered not to at-
tack Moldova and the expedition had to be made 
in the cooperation with Stephan. Olbracht had to 
agree with his brother’s demands – at least offi-
cially. The goal of the crusade was for sure Killia 
and Akkerman. But, didn’t he in reality look for 
the conflict with Stephan the Great? Didn’t he 
want to conquer Killia and Akkerman not to hand 
over it to the ruler of Moldova but to take it for 
himself? That would have given him the author-
ity over Moldova and control over the Black Sea’s 
trade. It is obvious that the Polish king had to as-
sure both his brother – Wladislaus and the whole 
Europe about the expedition against Turkey. Only 
such propaganda would give him necessary pro-
tection and Wladislaus’ agreement to his plans. 
But he knew (thanks to his envoy – Kurozwęcki to 
Stephan) that Stefan’s friendly attitude towards 
Poland was a fiction, and he knew that without 
Stephan’s permission the expedition to Killia and 
Akkerman could not be pursued, and that would 
have meant war with Moldova. Maybe he counted 
on Stephan’s refusal? 
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Antemurale Сhristianitatis? Propaganda anti-turcească şi obiectivul principal al 
expediţiei militare a lui Jan Olbracht
Cuvinte-cheie: Jan Olbraht, Moldova, bătălia din Codrii Cosminului, Ştefan cel Mare, Imperiul Otoman.
Rezumat: În studiu, în contextul surselor de propagandă anti-turcească, sunt abordate unele aspecte ale expediţiei 
bucovinene, din anul 1497, a regelui polonez Jan Olbracht. Scopul principal al acestuia constă în analiza aşa-
numitului bastion al creştinismului – Antemurale christianitatis. Autoarea cercetează problema prin prisma pro-
pagandei politicii private a dinastiei domnitoare ale Jagiellonilor. În urma studierii surselor autoarea demonstrează 
rolul expediţiei regelui polonez Jan Olbracht în sistemul relaţiilor polono-ungare de la sfârşitul secolului al XV-lea 
(congresul din Lewoczy). O atenţie specială este acordată rivalitatăţii militaro-politice dintre regatele Poloniei şi cel 
al Ungariei pentru influenţa asupra Moldovei.
Antemurale Сhristianitatis? Антитурецкая пропаганда и истинная цель военной 
экспедиции Яна Ольбрахта
Ключевые слова: Ян Ольбрахт, Молдова, сражение у Козминского леса, Стефан Великий, Османская им-
перия.
Резюме: В исследовании рассматриваются аспекты буковинской экспедиции польского короля Яна Оль-
брахта (1497 г.) в контексте источников антитурецкой пропаганды. Целью статьи является анализ так назы-
ваемого бастиона христианства – Antemurale Сhristianitatis. Автор освещает данный вопрос через призму 
приватной политики правящей династии Ягеллонов. На основе исследованных источников автор демон-
стрирует роль военной экспедиции польского короля Яна Ольбрахта в системе польско-венгерских отно-
шений конца XV века (съезд в Левоче). Особое внимание в статье уделяется военно-политическому сопер-
ничеству между польским и венгерским королевствами за влияние на Молдову.
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